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Running title: Non-demand revelation in hypothetical double referenda for 
public goods
Hypothetical Contingent Valuation (CV) Surveys used to elicit values for 
environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum 
mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this 
voting format.  One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents 
to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the 
good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard 
economic models of consumer preferences.  There are a number of published 
explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote.  
This paper investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of 
non-demand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people 
most likely to non- demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of an 
individual most likely to non-demand reveal as one who faces a negative surplus i.e. a 
net loss in the second vote and invokes non-self interested, non-financial motivations 
during the decision process.
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1.  Introduction
It has long been known that voters have an incentive to cast demand revealing 
votes in a one shot binding referendum (Gibbard, 1973 ; Satterthwaite, 1975).  
Economic theory has nothing to say regarding the impact of the non-binding nature of 
the task on demand revelation in hypothetical versions of the same referendum.
Despite this, the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation recommended that the 
hypothetical referendum mechanism be used in surveys to estimate losses associated 
with natural resource damages (Arrow et al. 1993).  
The single referendum has largely been superceded by the double referendum 
in contingent valuation surveys about environmental goods. This form of referendum 
requires the respondent to answer two yes-no questions of the type: “Would you pay 
£X for A?”  The first question poses a value of £X previously selected from a range of 
values.  The second question poses a value taken from a sub-range (either higher or 
lower than £X) that depends on the respondent’s answer to the first question.  If the 
respondent says yes (no) to the first question, they receive a higher (lower) offer 
amount in the second referendum round.
The statistical properties of this mechanism and its advantages are well-
documented (Hanemann et al., 1991; Alberini, 1995). Respondent willingness to pay 
(WTP) is bounded by the first and second bid into more precise intervals (yes-yes 
(YY), yes-no (YN), no-yes (NY) and no-no (NN)) than in the single bound 
mechanism. The validity of this method is based on the assumptions that responses 
are demand revealing in both the first and second referendum vote, and that subjects 
responses are based on a single underlying value of WTP. If subjects’ responses are 
not demand revealing in either or both votes their WTP will be incorrectly bounded.   
There exists sufficient evidence in the literature to suggest that, at least at the 
aggregate level, non-demand revelation in hypothetical double referenda in a field 
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setting is a problem (McFadden and Leonard, 1993; Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; 
Alberini, 1995; De Shazo, 2002). 
This evidence provides the motivation for this paper.  If a respondent treats a
referendum survey as hypothetical, then there are no economic predictions about the 
degree of non-demand revelation that might be present.  Nevertheless, by taking an 
individual-based approach to the problems of non-demand revelation, we may be able 
to observe systematic behavioural patterns in the data that suggest the chance of non-
demand revelation is higher in certain situations.  Some types of individuals may be
more prone to non-demand revelation than others.  
This approach contrasts with the contemporary view in the literature that non-
demand revelation is driven by a “one size fits all” behaviourally driven motivation, 
such as anchoring on the first offer (Herriges and Shogren, 1996) or loss aversion (De 
Shazo, 2002).  If it is possible to identify those individuals more likely to cast non-
demand revealing votes, we can begin to disentangle how people behave when faced 
with such a decision mechanism, despite its hypothetical nature.1  In addition, we can 
provide the first experimental evidence to address the caution noted by the NOAA 
Panel who stated that “If a double-bounded dichotomous choice or some other question 
form is used in order to obtain more information per respondent, experiments should be 
developed to investigate biases that may be introduced,” (Arrow et al., 1993, p. 4612).
Such experimental investigation has, to date, been notably lacking.  Although
an experiment may be considered different in many ways from a survey, lessons can
nevertheless be drawn from it which can assist in survey design and/or model
estimation. For example, in the experiment to be reported we find that the likelihood 
1
 There is a trend to assert that respondents may treat contingent valuation surveys as advisory, rather 
than inconsequential (after Carson , Groves, and Machina, 1999).  Unless this is proven, we take the 
view that at least some respondents will treat the exercise as truly hypothetical (which may vary from a 
large majority to a small minority, depending on the survey). As such, this paper relates to these 
respondents and not all respondents to a CV survey.
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of subjects facing losses casting non-demand revealing yes votes is greater than the 
likelihood of subjects facing gains casting non-demand revealing no votes. In other 
words, subjects appear to respond to hypothetical gains as if they were real gains, but 
behave more recklessly in the face of hypothetical losses.  Although it is unobservable 
in the field whether a survey respondent faces a gain or a loss (since the benefits from 
provision of the environmental good are known only to the survey respondent) 
additional safeguards to discourage such reckless behaviour could be introduced into 
the survey.  Likewise, certain types of individuals are found to be more prone to non-
demand revelation. It may therefore be possible to identify them at some stage in a
survey, and perhaps separate them out.  We return to these two issues in more detail 
towards the end of the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The experimental design is in 
Section 2.  We report the results in Sections 3 and 4 and discuss their implications in 
Section 5. Concluding thoughts are in Section 6.
2.  Treatments, Voting Patterns and Experimental Design
In a survey, respondents’ benefits from the public good are unknown. In 
addition, we do not know how respondents to field-based survey instruments perceive 
the incentive structure of the survey.  There is the potential for different perceived 
incentives present within the same survey. These two problems make the laboratory 
environment preferable to a field setting for investigating questions about potential 
sources of bias.  The induced value setting allows the researcher to know each 
subject’s value of the public good, allowing us to easily distinguish between demand 
revealing and non-demand revealing responses.  In addition, it is possible for the 
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researcher to carefully control the incentive structure, to ensure that the referendum is 
purely hypothetical i.e. inconsequential.  
We define the experimental public good as a group investment. Individuals are 
allocated a return (R) from the investment (their benefit) and a personal cost (C). This 
induced value structure is analogous to the benefits and costs to the respondent in a 
CV survey.  We generate an underlying WTP distribution and bid scheme by varying 
the R and C across subjects.  For some subjects the benefit outweighs the cost and 
they should vote for provision of the good while for others the reverse is true.  The 
main point here is to highlight those subjects who vote yes, even when the cost 
outweighs the benefit and, as such, appear to exhibit hypothetical bias.  It is 
hypothesised that it is this type of respondent who contributes at least in some part to 
the anomalies observed in field data.
In this experiment, for each subject type (defined by an individual’s value of R 
and C) there are two sets of voting patterns of interest: demand revealing (DR) and 
observed (OB). The DR voting pattern is that which is predicted by and truthfully 
reflects the distribution of induced values.  The OB voting pattern is the pattern 
actually observed for a treatment.  This may or may not coincide with the DR pattern. 
In a field double referendum only the OB voting pattern is observed.  As we cannot 
make any theoretical prediction of the likely effect of inconsequentiality we test the 
null hypothesis that the OB and DR voting patterns are the same. 
      One hundred forty-four students at the U.S. Air Force Academy participated 
voluntarily in the experiment.  Each experimental session consisted of a group of nine 
subjects, for a total of 16 experimental sessions.  
The decision mechanism is an inconsequential double referendum.  In each 
session, subjects participate in two voting rounds on the provision of the group 
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investment.  Each subject in the experiment is endowed at the start with 100 tokens 
(the experimental currency).  In the first voting round subjects know their return (R) 
and cost (C) of the investment.  Subjects cast secret ballots on whether or not the 
group should make the investment.  If the vote passes, each subjects’ token balance 
changes from 100 tokens to 100 – R + C tokens.  If the vote fails, subjects keep their 
original 100 tokens.  The vote requires at least six yeses to pass. Because the 
incentive structure of the experimental design requires an inconsequential referendum 
in order to correspond with the incentives of a truly hypothetical field referendum 
survey, there no link between subjects’ token balance and their experimental earnings 
in dollars.  Subjects earn $10 for a 40-minute experimental session regardless of their 
final account balance in tokens.2
After the first round vote, subjects learn that they will vote again on the group 
investment.  They receive new secret ballots with the same return (R) but a new cost 
(NewC).  Is a subject voted yes in the first vote, his or her cost is higher in the second 
vote.  The reverse is true for a subject who voted no in the first vote.  The second vote 
proceeds just as the first.  As with the first vote, subjects’ cash earnings are $10 
regardless of the outcome of the vote.  As with a double referendum CV surveys, 
subjects do not know that they will vote twice when they make their first voting 
decision.  
Figure 1 presents a schematic of the double referendum design.  Two key 
features of the bid design in CV surveys that we employ are the use of multiple 
starting costs and overlapping costs in the first and second round.  Half of the subjects 
have a starting cost (C) of 50 and half have a starting cost of 70.  The second vote 
costs are contingent upon a subject’s first round vote and the bid design, and cannot 
2 Weekly cadet take-home pay ranges from $65-$100. 
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8
be assigned a priori.  All experimental packets were assembled so as to make the 
proper materials available to the subject no matter which way he or she voted in the 
first round.
The distribution of R is such that 2/3 of the subjects have the low R value of 
40, and 1/3 have the high R value of 80.  This distribution of values allows us to 
obtain more observations from subjects who we expect to exhibit hypothetical bias 
(R=40 subjects), the issue of interest in this study.  This distribution has no effect on 
any one individual’s likelihood of non-demand revelation as it is unknown.  If 
individuals behave as if the referendum is consequential, then their optimal response 
it to cast a demand revealing vote.  The demand revealing voting paths for each 
subject type are in bold.  Although the overall distribution of first round costs and 
returns is as in Figure 1, we randomly assign costs and returns from this distribution 
to individual subjects in each experimental session.  In this way, the distribution of 
subject types differs across sessions.
In order to explore whether individual characteristics of subjects were 
responsible for the propensity to cast demand revealing or non-demand revealing 
votes we administered a qualitative debriefing questionnaire after the second vote 
which asked respondents to explain in their own words their reasons for voting the 
way they did.
3.  Experimental Results
Table 1 reports the DR and OB vote distributions.  For clarity, we will use the 
notation C1 to refer to subjects’ first round costs and C2 to refer to subjects’ second 
round costs throughout this discussion of the results.  We analyse the differences 
between the DR and OB vote distributions across each of the double bounded 
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9
intervals, a process which is not possible with field data because the DR vote 
distributions are unknown.  This analysis allows us to clearly identify (i) the degree of 
demand revelation in the sample as a whole, (ii) subject types with a greater 
propensity for non-demand revelation and (iii) the intervals where non-demand 
revealing behaviour is most prevalent.
We can clearly see that non-demand revealing behaviour is not confined to the 
second vote, at odds with the conventional assumption in the econometric analysis of 
field data (Cameron and Quiggin, 1994; Alberini, 1995).  For each subject type there 
is a single interval (YY, YN, NY, NN) in which all demand revealing responses 
should be bounded. Any observed deviation from this prediction is significant and
does not require a statistical test. The OB vote distributions show many such 
violations, ranging from 4.2% non-demand revelation in the R=80, C1 = 50 subject 
type to 27.1% in the R=40, C1 = 50 subject type.
It also appears that the rate of non-demand revelation is greater for subject
types facing a potential net loss if they vote yes (top half of Table I, R=40, C1=50 and 
R=40, C1=70), while those facing a net gain are less likely to give non-demand 
revealing responses by voting no (bottom half of Table I, R=80, C1=50 and R=80, 
C1=70).  A chi-squared test on the rates of non-demand revelation by subject type 
reveals that subjects facing a loss in the first round are significantly more likely to 
cast non-demand revealing votes at the 10% level (p = 0.061).  The rate of non-
demand revelation in the second vote is not significantly different for subjects facing 
losses and subjects facing gains (p = 0.285).  When comparing subjects facing an 
absolute gain of 10 with a loss of 10, or a gain of 30 with a loss of 30, there is no 
difference in the rate of non-demand revelation between losers and gainers.  
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4.  Alternative Explanations of Double Referendum Voting Patterns
Before considering the impact of individual heuristics and motivations of 
voting behaviour, we first turn to the literature for behavioural explanations consistent
with our data.  If deviations in our OB data match the predictions from the literature, a 
customised exploration becomes unnecessary. If such explanations exist, we might 
assume that non-demand revelation in a hypothetical referendum, whether in an 
experiment or a CV survey, may well be generated by this behaviour and mitigating 
procedures could be developed and introduced into a CV survey where possible.
We turn first to prospect theory as applied to iterative CV question formats by 
DeShazo (2002).  From our data set we draw out the negatively framed prospect in the 
ascending branch R=80, C1=50, C2=70.  This is the subject group to which prospect 
theory is most likely to apply.  In this group, 23 out of 24 subjects voted yes to both 
C1=50 and C2=70, as predicted by conventional economic theory.  Under prospect 
theory we would expect some subjects to vote yes-no.  We observe none (one subject 
voted no-no).  Furthermore, comparing the negatively framed R=80, C1=50, C2=70,
subject type with the comparable unframed prospect (R=80, C1=70), we observe that 
23 out of 24 subjects voted yes to C=70 in the former and 22 out of 24 voted yes to 
C=70 in the latter.  Thus prospect theory does explain the deviations from demand 
revealing behaviour present in our data.
We then turn to seven further strategies (Table II). Five of the response 
strategies (Strategies1-5) conflict with our observed voting patterns for all subject 
types. These strategies assume demand revealing voting in the first round while we
observe some non-demand revealing responses for each subject type in the first round.   
Of the remaining two strategies, Strategy 6 (yea-saying affecting the first and second 
vote) performs better than Strategy 7 (bargaining affecting the first and second vote) 
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but still fails to predict five observed votes in the NN interval for three subject types 
(R=40, C1=50; R=80, C1=50; R=80, C1=70).     
We hypothesise that the reason for the failure of any of the above strategies to 
predict our observed voting patterns is that some non-demand revealing voters are 
adopting one strategy and some another.  As a result no single strategy predicts 
population voting patterns.  This leads us to the results from the second part of our 
experiment.
Subjects’ responses to the qualitative debriefing questionnaire were content 
analysed3 (Krippendorf, 1980) by three independent coders using the coding frame in 
Table III.4 To take account of the possibility of different subject strategies we 
combine subjects’ induced values (R-C1 and R-C2) and the behavioural heuristics 
cited in the questionnaires in a predictive logit model (N = 116).5 The model allows 
us to establish whether either or both of the above individual-specific data are good 
predictors of incorrectly bounding a subject’s WTP.  If a characteristic indicates a 
high likelihood that a subject’s WTP will be incorrectly bounded, we can define a 
separating-out mechanism to identify individuals most likely to cast non-demand 
3 Content analysis is a method of counting the occurrence of certain concepts within a piece of 
qualitative data.  This is a robust form of analysis that allows qualitative factors to be quantified and 
counted in a reliable and objective manner.  The aim of this technique is not to capture all available 
information but rather to capture the key points from the data.  It is possible to isolate concepts from 
the data and to assess their importance in generating the observed responses.  Applying this analysis to 
the subjects’ written responses provides a set of codes which can be used to test which heuristics 
demand revealing and non-demand revealing subjects used to explain their voting in the referendum.
4 Our coding scheme can be considered reliable.  To generate our reliability statistic (kappa) we use
Fleiss and Cuzick’s (1979) extension of the Cohen kappa method for three or more coders with two 
possible responses per coder (technical validation is in Fleiss 1981).  Statistically highly significant z 
tests for all codes indicate that we reject the null hypotheses that the ratings are independent (i.e. kappa 
= 0) and conclude that agreement is better than one would expect by chance.  Kappa’s for the codes 
reported herein range from 0.61 to 0.95 with 50% in the “good” category and 50% in the “very good” 
category using Landis and Koch’s (1977) five point scale ranging from < 0.2 = poor to > 0.81 = very 
good.
5 28 subject questionnaires were drawn as a stratified random sample from the 144 total to develop the 
coding frame.  These are not included in the final analysis in order to comply with the independence 
criterion (Krippendorf 1980).  This left 116 questionnaires for the subsequent analysis.
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revealing votes.  Thus, the probability of incorrect bounding in the double referendum 
is modeled as a function of the qualitative heuristics cited by the individual and their 
surpluses (net gains or losses) in the first and second votes. Table IV contains the 
results.  We consider the implications of these results for CV surveys below.
With the exception of Vote2, the qualitative variables are all statistically 
significant at the 1% or 5% levels.  These heuristics can be grouped into two broad 
categories: those expressing either self-interested, financially motivated 
considerations (RvsC, PROFIT, LOSS) and those that do not (GROUP, 
HYPOTHETICAL, VOTE2).  The signs of the coefficients are as might be expected 
in that subjects who cite heuristics in the second category are more likely to be 
incorrectly bounded, as indicated by positive signs on these coefficients.  Those in the 
first category are less likely to be incorrectly bounded, as shown by negative signs on 
these coefficients. Examination of the odds ratio (Exp(B)) shows, for example, that 
subjects who cite HYPOTHETICAL are 50.94  times more likely than not to be 
incorrectly bounded. Similarly those mentioning GROUP are 11.76 times more likely 
than not to be incorrectly bounded while those citing PROFIT are 330 times less 
likely (i.e. 1/.003) to be incorrectly bounded.  
Regarding the two quantitative variables (SURPLUS VOTE 1 and SURPLUS 
VOTE 2) we find that only SURPLUS VOTE 2 is significant (1% level), indicating 
that negative surplus in the second round increases the probability that an individual 
will be incorrectly bounded and a positive surplus that they will be correctly bounded. 
The model is 90% correct in predicting incorrect bounding and 98% correct in 
predicting correct bounding as shown in Table IV.    
5.  Discussion
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Two things are clear from the above analysis. The first is that the nature of the 
surplus matters.  In our inconsequential double referendum, hypothetical gains appear 
to have incentive properties similar to real gains. The same does not apply to 
hypothetical losses, where the incentive properties seem very weak, particularly in the 
second vote.  Here, when faced with a loss, some subjects invoke non-self interested, 
non-financial considerations and give non-demand revealing responses.  The second 
is that the impact of individual specific characteristics seems to be a more 
comprehensive, albeit simple, explanation of non-demand revelation in a hypothetical 
double referendum than more complicated behavioural strategies. 
Each of these findings has differing implications in respect of the potential to 
deal with them in a CV survey.  Regarding the weak incentive property of 
hypothetical losses, as the decision task is hypothetical, we cannot call on economic 
theory to explain why the prospect of a loss has poorer incentive properties than a 
hypothetical gain and leads some people to invoke such heuristics.  Nevertheless, it 
may be possible in field surveys to develop a series of questions that could provide 
some indication as to the likelihood that a respondent who voted yes would face a net 
loss if the referendum passed.  The effect on WTP of taking these subjects’ responses
out of the WTP estimation could be explored.  
In a similar and possibly more fruitful vein, it may be more feasible to address 
the second issue of how individual characteristics affect demand revelation. The 
experiment shows that subjects were easily able to provide coherent reasons for their 
vote and the responses showed that the subjects were not confused by the task or 
mechanism per se.  Any additional difficulty in answering a referendum question in a 
survey would therefore arise out of the complexity of the good and subjects’ 
uncertainty about their value for the good.
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Given the difficulties inherent determining whether a subject derives a positive 
or negative surplus if the referendum passes, we recommend that any separating 
mechanism in  a field CV survey rely, at least at this stage, on subject-stated 
heuristics.  A practical mechanism that is compatible with field data can be derived 
from this experiment. In this experiment, incorrectly bounded subjects are identified 
as those who cite one or more non-self-interested, non-financially motivated 
heuristics and who do not cite a self-interested, financially motivated heuristic relating 
to the positive surplus they could gain from their vote. In our experiment, the non-
self-interested, non-financially motivated heuristics were HYPOTHETICAL, GROUP 
and VOTE2 and the self-interested, financially motivated heuristics were RvsC, 
PROFIT and LOSS.  In a CV survey of an environmental good other expressions may 
be used to describe these concepts of PROFIT and LOSS.  In addition, to an extent, 
heuristics are an artifact of the task.  Thus, in the field, one might expect respondents 
to express the importance or value for money of preserving the environment.  A 
response that expressed more concern for the b nefits to others than the respondent’s 
own benefits from the good would indicate that the respondent is motivated by 
GROUP concerns.
Applying our practical separating mechanism based only on heuristics to our 
sample of 116 responses identifies 18 out of the 20 incorrectly bounded subjects. It 
identifies a data set of 86 correctly bounded responses, of which only 2 are observed 
as incorrectly bounded.  This mechanism is not as precise as the logit model and 
identifies 12 correctly bounded responses as incorrectly bounded.  
6.  Conclusion
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This paper set out to explore whether any systematic patterns exist in terms of 
non-demand revelation in a hypothetical experiment designed to explore voting 
decisions in a double referendum, the mechanism of choice of many CV practitioners.
It demonstrates the usefulness of using subjects’ underlying values for the public good 
in discovering the origin of hypothetical bias. It also set out to determine whether
some individuals are more prone to non-demand revelation than others.  In both case, 
we report affirmative results, in that if subjects face a net loss they are more likely to 
vote against their interests in the sense of voting yes when they should have voted no, 
and further admitted to using heuristics that differed from their demand revealing 
counterparts.
Findings from this experiment can be carried over into CV survey design in 
the sense that the experiment demonstrates the potential to develop customized 
debriefing surveys that can subsequently be used to separate out groups of 
respondents in the data set to explore their impact on WTP estimation.  Clearly, the 
more non-demand revealers in a sample, the more inaccurate will be the resulting 
estimate so a mechanism by which to identify such respondents in a hypothetical field 
survey could be potentially very important.
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TABLE I
Observed and Predicted Vote Distributions and Surpluses by Subject Type 
YY YN NY NN Total
Subject type n % n % N % n % n %
R = 40, C1 = 50
Predicted 0                0 0                0 48             100 0                0 48             100
Observed 6             12.5 5             10.4 35             72.9 2              4.2 48             100
R – C1 -10 -10 -10 -10
R – C2 -30 -30 +10 +10
R = 40, C1 = 70
Predicted 0                0 0                0 0                0 48             100 48             100
Observed 5             10.4 1              2.1 1 2.1 41             85.4 48             100
R – C1 -30 -30 -30 -30
R – C2 -50 -50 -10 -10
R = 80, C1 = 50
Predicted 24             100 0                0 0                0 0                0 24             100
Observed 23 95.8 0                0 0                0 1              4.2 24             100
R – C1 +30 +30 +30 +30
R – C2 +10 +10 +50 +50
R = 80, C1 = 70
Predicted 0                0 24             100 0                0 0              0 24             100
Observed 1              4.2 21             87.5 0                0 2               8.3 24             100
R – C1 +10 +10 +10 +10
R – C2 -10 -10 +30 +30
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TABLE II
Response Strategies from the Literature
OB1 DR1 Response Strategies2WTP
Bound 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R = 40, C1 = 50
70- YY 6 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0 =0
50-70 YN 5 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0 =0
30-50 NY 35 48 <48 <48 <48 <48 =48 <48 <48
0-30 NN 2 0 >0 >0 >0 >0 =0 =0 >0
R = 40, C1 = 70
90- YY 5 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0 =0
70-90 YN 1 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 0 =0
50-70 NY 1 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0 0 =0
0-50 NN 41 48 =48 =48 =48 =48 <48 <48 =48
R = 80, C1 = 50
70- YY 23 24 <24 <24 =24 =24 =24 =24 <24
50-70 YN 0 0 >0 >0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0
30-50 NY 0 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0
0-30 NN 1 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0
R = 80, C1 = 70
90- YY 1 0 =0 =0 >0 >0 >0 >0 =0
70-90 YN 21 24 =24 =24 <24 <24 <24 <24 <24
50-70 NY 0 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 0 0 =0
0-50 NN 2 0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 =0 >0
1 OB = Observed Bounding; DRB = Demand Revealing
2Response Strategies refer to the effect on resulting vote distribution relative to truthful revelation of 
strategies 1-4 outlined and discussed in Carson, Groves and Machina (1999) and 5-7 in Deshazo 
(2002).  Strategy 1 is an uncertain second cost hypothesis (for risk averse respondents). Strategy 2 is a 
bargaining hypothesis affecting the second vote. Strategy 3 is a weighted average cost hypothesis and 
Strategy 4 is a quantity/quality shift hypothesis affecting the second vote. Strategy 5 is yea saying in 
the second vote only. Strategy 6 (yea saying II) affects both the first and second votes and Strategy 
7(strategic behavior II) is bargaining affecting the first and second votes.
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TABLE III
Content Analysis Coding Frame
CODE DESCRIPTION
R vs. C A self-interested, explicit comparison of subject’s cost of the 
investment compared to the return
PROFIT Explicit mention of the fact that subject may profit, return, 
gain, or earn (including calculations thereof).
LOSS Explicit mention of the fact that subject may make a loss or 
lose money (including calculations thereof).
GROUP Acknowledgement of the other members of the group (e.g. the 
effect of an individual vote on the group outcomje or the 
payoffs of other members of the group; consideration of what 
might happen to others if the vote passed or failed).
HYPOTHETICAL Allusion to the inconsequential nature of the task (e.g. that 
dollar earning are not affect by voting decisions; that token 
earnings do not affect dollar earnings).
VOTE2 Allusion to the fact that this was a second vote (e.g. mentions 
of previous/changing costs, previous vote, possible future 
votes).
*The following quotes illustrate statements that result in a code being marked as 
present for a given questionnaire.  Additional examples available from the authors.
R vs. C: “The return was greater than the value invested.”
PROFIT: “In order to end up with more tokens than I originally started with I had to 
vote yes.  I knew there was no change, but still making more tokens seem like the 
logical thing to do.
LOSS: If we voted Yes then I would lose 10 tokens.
GROUP: I just figured if I was at a loss everyone else was probably gaining so I 
though I would help them out.
HYPOTHETICAL: First of all, I thought about how the tokens don’t matter with the 
money…”
VOTE2: “However, if there is the possibility of long term capital gains, it might not 
be awful to lose 10 tokens at first.”
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TABLE IV
Logit Model Relating the Likelihood of Non-Demand Revealing Bounding to the Use 
of Heuristics and Respondent Surpluses
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
R vs. C -3.60 1.42 6.38 1 0.012 0.027
PROFIT -5.16 1.76 8.63 1 0.003 0.006
LOSS -2.92 1.41 4.26 1 0.039 0.054
GROUP 2.46 1.12 4.82 1 0.028 11.60
HYPOTHETICAL 3.93 1.26 9.78 1 0.002 50.94
VOTE2 1.88 1.28 2.16 1 0.142 6.55
SURPLUS VOTE 1 0.04 0.03 1.68 1 0.195 1.04
SURPLUS VOTE 2 -0.10 0.03 10.95 1 0.001 0.905
CONSTANT -1.08 1.34 0.65 1 0.420 0.339
-2*LOG LIKELIHOOD 37.4421
COX & SNELL R-SQUARED 0.449
NEGELKERKE R-SQUARED 0.7473
N 116
Predicted  bounding                     %
                                                                          Correct               incorrect
Observed            Correct                                      94                         2                        98
bounding            Incorrect                                      2                        18                       90
Overall  %                                                                                                                    97
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FIGURE 1.  Schematic of the Design of the Inconsequential Double Referendum 
Experiment
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